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ABSTRACT 
The article first analyses the relationship between the Montreal Convention and 
Regulation 261/2004. Although the Regulation and the Convention both relate to the 
protection of air passenger’s rights it remains ambiguous when and in which disputes these 
acts should be applicable. Thus, this article reveals the problematical issue of how these acts 
differ and in which situations they are applicable. Second, it reviews the development of the 
EUCJ case law regarding the application of these acts. Third, it examines the relevant case 
law of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Lithuania in this area. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The goal of the Montreal Convention of 1999 and Regulation No 261/2004 is 
to protect air passenger’s rights addressing air carrier liability. Nevertheless, legal 
status, the scope and application of these acts differ. Moreover, the spectrum of 
protected air passenger rights, remedies, and compensation differ. Thus, it may 
remain ambiguous in which situation they shall be applicable, what the differences 
between the scope materia of these acts are, and whether they shall be applicable 
in each case separately or (and) together. 
In order to answer to these questions the article analyses the provisions of 
Regulation 261/2004 which cover three situations – denied boarding, flight 
cancellation and delay of flight. The Montreal Convention in relation to Regulation 
No 261/2004 is analysed only to the extent that it governs the delay of the carriage 
by air of passengers. The article crystalizes the main differences between these two 
acts. 
Also the article takes into account the most relevant scientific literature that 
focuses mainly on the criticism over Regulation 261/2004 and defends the 
exclusivity of the Montreal Convention. The articles rejects the argument that the 
provisions of the Regulation conflicts with the norms of the Montreal Convention. 
The EUCJ case law related to the application of both acts is investigated. This 
is done in order to overview and highlight the main trends in the jurisprudence of 
the EUCJ in air passenger’s rights. Concepts of flight, itinerary, extraordinary 
circumstances, flight delay, cancellation, denied boarding, material and non-
material damage, arrival time are examined in the article. 
The Lithuanian experience will be considered in order to observe how the 
Regulation No 261/2004 and the Montreal Convention are applied in national legal 
system and case law. 
1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONVENTION AND THE 
REGULATION IN CASE LAW OF THE EUCJ 
In order to reveal the relationship between the Montreal Convention of 1999 
(hereinafter – Convention) and Regulation No 261/2004 (hereinafter – Regulation) 
this part of the article focuses on the goals, purposes, scope of application of both 
acts.1 
                                         
1 It should be noted that the very first opinion on the relationship between the Convention and the 
Regulation was delivered by Advocate General M. L.A. Geelhoed. The advocate in a very detailed way 
analyzed the differences between these two documents and supported the idea that the provisions of the 
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1.1. THE GOAL OF THE CONVENTION AND THE REGULATION 
The preamble of the Convention emphasises the importance of ensuring 
protection of the interests of consumers in international carriage by air.2 Recital 1 
of the Regulation provides a high level protection for air passengers. 3  Despite 
different wording of the goals in both acts, their primary purpose is the same: to 
protect air passenger’s rights and address air carrier’s liability to passengers. 
1.2. THE CONVENTIONS’ PRIMACY OVER THE REGULATION 
The State Parties (hereinafter – SP) of the Convention are not only EU 
Member States (hereinafter – MS) but also more than 100 countries. Moreover, the 
EUCJ on the basis of Article 300 (7) (TFEU Article 218), stated that “the Community 
institutions are bound by agreements concluded by the Community and, 
consequently, that those agreements have primacy over secondary Community 
legislation”4. Thus, the Convention is an international treaty and an integral part of 
the Community legal order and the Regulation is a secondary legal act.5 
It follows that the Convention has primacy over the Regulation: “<...> 
Articles 19, 22 and 29 of the Montreal Convention are among the rules in the light 
of which the Court reviews the legality of acts of the Community institutions <…>”6. 
1.3. THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION 
The Regulation defines the scope of the application which is found in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 3. 
Analysing the territorial application of the Regulation four different situations 
can be identified, including recital 6 in the preamble: 
1. it is applicable in any case regardless of the carrier’s licence when the flight is 
within the EU. 
                                                                                                                       
Regulation does not conflict with the norms of the Montreal Convention. See: Opinion of Advocate 
General M. L.A. Geelhoed, Delivered on 8 September 2005. 
2  Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (the Montreal 
Convention), Official Journal L 194, 18/07/2001 P. 0039 – 0049. 
3 Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 
establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied 
boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (Text 
with EEA relevance) - Commission Statement, Official Journal L 046, 17/02/2004 P. 0001 – 0008. 
4 See: Emirates Airlines – Direktion für Deutschland v. Diether Schenkel, (C-173/07) EU:C:2008:400 
[2008], para 43; Friederike Wallentin-Hermann v. Alitalia – Linee Aeree Italiane SpA, (C-549/07) 
EU:C:2008:771 [2008], para 28; International Air Transport Association, European Low Fares Airline 
Association v. Department for Transport, (C-344/04) EU:C:2006:10 [2006], para 35. 
5 Air Baltic Corporation AS v. Lietuvos Respublikos specialiųjų tyrimų tarnyba, (C-429/14) EU:C:2016:88 
[2016], para 23; International Air Transport Association, European Low Fares Airline Association, supra 
note 4, para 36; Axel Walz v Clickair SA, (C-63/09) EU:C:2010:251 [2010], para 20, etc. 
6 International Air Transport Association, European Low Fares Airline Association, supra note 4, para 39. 
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2. it is applicable in any case regardless of carrier’s licence when the flight is 
from the EU to the third country.7 
3. it is applicable when the carrier is a Community carrier when the flight is from 
the third country to the EU. The Regulation is not applicable when the flight is 
form the third country to the EU and the carrier is not Community carrier. 
4. it is not applicable regardless of a carrier when the flight is from the third 
country to the third country. 
Thus, the application of the Regulation depends on the place of departure and 
arrival of the flight and/or carrier’s licence.8 
Article 3(2) of the Regulation defines the conditions under which Article 3(1) 
is applicable. Two basic conditions are laid down: passengers shall have a 
confirmed reservation and have been transferred from the flight for which they held 
reservation to another flight. 
Therefore, the Regulation is applicable when passengers have confirmed 
reservation or have been transferred to another flight when the flight is within the 
EU or is from the EU to the third country regardless of carrier’s licence or the flight 
is from the third country to the EU when the carrier is a Community carrier. 
The application of the Convention depends only on the territory of the SPs 
(territorial jurisdiction). 
Analysing Article 1 of Convention, three different situations can be identified: 
1. The Convention is applicable when the flight is from one SP to another SP. 
2. The Convention is applicable when the flight is within a single SP and there is 
a stop in another SP or third state. Some authors pointed out that such 
regulation may result absurd situation when two person sitting in the same 
aircraft may be subject to two different legal regimes9. Also the US case law 
has established two cumulative conditions: “(1) the country where the 
departure and destination cities are located is a party to the Convention; and 
(2) there was an ‘agreed stopping place’ within the territory of a second 
country, even if it is not a party to the Convention”10. 
3. The Convention is not applicable when the flight is within a single SP (no stop 
in another state).11 
                                         
7 The latest case law of the EUCJ has shown that Article 3(1) of the Regulation applies in the event of 
denied boarding, cancellation or long delay of flights in the case when the carriage by air is from the EU 
to the third country with the scheduled stopover in the third country with the change of aircraft and the 
carriage by air was booked as a single unit. See: Claudia Wegener v Royal Air Maroc SA, (C-537/17) 
EU:C:2018:361 [2018], para 5, 24, 26. 
8 See: Emirates Airlines, supra note 4, para 29, 30. 
9 Michael Milde, Essential Air and Space Law (Eleven: International Publishing, 2008), 283–284. 
10 See: Paul Larsen, Paul B. Sweeney, and Joseph John Gillick, Aviation Law: Cases, Laws and Related 
Sources, 2nd edition (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), 344; Jones v. USA 3000 
Airlines, 2009 U.S. District LEXIS 9049 (E.D.Mo. 2009). 
11 Paul Dempsey, Michael Milde, International Air Carrier Liability: The Montreal Convention of 1999 
(Canada: McGill University, 2005), 69. 
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Thus, in contrast to the Regulation the carrier’s licence in neither case may make 
impact on the application of the Convention. The Convention is applicable only if 
the flight has a link with the territory of at least one MS. Additionally, in contrast to 
the Regulation the Convention is not applicable to a flight within the same country. 
1.4. PROTECTED AIR PASSENGERS RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER 
THE CONVENTION AND THE REGULATION 
Article 1(1) of the Regulation grants only the minimum rights to air 
passengers. The EUCJ in Folkerts case emphasized that article 1(1) must be 
interpreted together with articles 4, 5, 6 of the Regulation that encompass three 
different situations when air passengers enjoy minimum rights: 
1. When they are denied boarding against their will (Article 4), 
2. When their flights are cancelled (Article 5), 
3. When their flights are delayed (Article 6). 12 
Thus, the Regulation establishes certain package (exhaustive list) of air 
passenger rights. The damage caused by other actions by the air carrier (for 
instance, lost baggage) do not fall under the scope of the Regulation and the 
remedies can be found in national law. 
In contrast, the Convention is relevant only to the extent that it governs a 
delay of the carriage by air of passengers (Article 19), limits of liability in relation to 
delay (Article 22), basis of claims (Article 29). In other words, the Convention also 
covers such cases when the damage made to baggage, cargo, death or bodily 
injury of passengers. The Regulation does not govern such situations. Thus, the 
application ratione materiae of the Convention differs since it is applicable to the 
different air passenger rights (except delay of the flight). 
Also, the Regulation provides different remedies for different situations: 
1. In the case of denied boarding air carriers should compensate (Article 7), 
reroute/reimburse (Article 8) and care (Article 9), 
2. In the case of cancellation of a flight air carriers should assist in the form of 
rerouting or reimbursement (Article 8) and care, in the form of meals, etc. 
(Article 9), but they should not provide compensation (Article 7), if the 
passengers were informed in good time or if the carrier can prove that 
cancellation is caused by extraordinary circumstances, 
3. In the case of delay air carriers should only care under Article 9, except for 
delays of five hours or more. In that situation a passenger is also entitled to 
reimbursement in accordance with Article 8.13 
                                         
12 Air France SA v. Heinz-Gerke Folkerts, Luz-Tereza Folkerts, (C-11/11) EU:C:2013:106 [2013], para 
26. 
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The legal remedies under the Convention are different. It covers the liability 
of an air carrier for damage caused in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger 
and damage sustained in case of destruction or loss of checked baggage (Article 
17), damage to cargo (Article 18), damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by 
air of passengers, baggage or cargo (Article 19). 
Also both acts establish different statutory limits to bring an action before the 
court. Article 35 of the Convention governs the limitation of actions – an action 
should be brought within a period of two years. In contrast in the Regulation No 
262/2004 time limits for bringing actions are not established. The EUCJ has 
specified that actions for compensation under Articles 5 and 7 of the Regulation 
should be brought on the basis of limitations of actions’ rules of each MS.14 
Overall, the Regulation and the Convention differ from the material and 
procedural point of view. Thus, it may be debatable whether the protection of both 
acts overlap. 
1.5. COMPENSATION 
According to the EUCJ case law, Articles 19, 22 and 29 of the Convention 
govern the conditions under which, after a flight has been delayed, the air 
passengers concerned may bring actions for damages against the carriers liable for 
damage resulting from that delay.15 In contrast, the Regulation contains additional 
instruments for the air carrier liability in cases of denied boarding, cancellation or 
delay.16 Therefore, the Regulation and the Convention “established two separate 
compensation systems pursuing different objects”17. 
Thus, the Convention governs an individual passenger’s right to bring an 
action before the court in order to claim damages caused by the delay of the 
flight.18 Furthermore, Article 19 of the Convention implies that the damage should 
arise as a result of a delay, that there should be a causal link between the delay 
and the damage and that the damage is individual to passengers depending on the 
various losses sustained by them.19 However, the EUCJ case law has extended the 
term “individual passenger’s right” to the claims for damages. Here we can find one 
more difference: in contrast to the Regulation under the Convention the employer 
                                                                                                                       
13 Opinion of Advocate General M. L.A. Geelhoed, supra note 1, para 18. 
14 Joan Cuadrench Moré v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV, (C-139/11) EU:C:2012:741 [2012], 
para 33. 
15 International Air Transport Association, European Low Fares Airline Association, supra note 4, para 44. 
16 Opinion of Advocate General M. L.A. Geelhoed, supra note 1, para 40. 
17 Jiří Malenovský, “Regulation 261: Three Major Issues in the Case Law of the Court of Justice of the 
EU”: 26; in: Michal Bobek and Jeremias Prassl, Air Passenger Rights. Ten Years On (Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2016). 
18 Opinion of Advocate General M. L.A. Geelhoed, supra note 1, para 50. 
19 Emeka Nelson, Bill Chinazo Nelson, Brian Cheimezie Nelson v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, (C-581/10) 
EU:C:2012:657 [2012], para 50. 
BALTIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS  ISSN 2029-0454 
VOLUME 11, NUMBER 1  2018 
 
 27 
has the right to claim damages.20 The regulation does not provide such possibility 
and only the person who suffers damage can bring a claim under this act. 
In sum, the provisions of the Regulation do not relate to damage that arose 
as a result of delay. It governs standardized and immediate assistance, care and 
compensatory measures related to the inconveniences caused in the cases of 
denied boarding, flight cancellation and long delay. 21  However, the above 
mentioned measures do not preclude the air passengers concerned from bringing 
actions to redress damage under the conditions laid down by the Convention, 
because the same delay can cause individual damage.22 
1.6. CARRYING OF PASSENGERS 
Regarding the separation of the Convention and the Regulation, it is also 
important to note that the Convention does not regulate the carrying of air 
passengers when the flight is delayed. Meanwhile the Regulation estimates minimal 
services and assistance governed by Articles 7-9.23 P. S. Dempsey and M. Milde 
described this as follows: “it [Regulation] contains specific rules dealing with the 
strict duty of the carrier to assist delayed passengers by offering meal and 
refreshments, hotel accommodation, and free phone, telex or fax messages, or e-
mails and even reimbursement of the cost of the ticket or rerouting”24. 
The granting of such services cannot be denied even when “exceptional 
circumstances” arise and they result the denied boarding, cancellation of the flight 
or delay. However, when "exceptional circumstances" arise Article 5 (3) preserves 
the air carrier from the obligation to pay compensation under Article 7 of the 
Regulation.25 
1.7. CRITISISM OVER REGULATION NO 261/ 2004 
Some scholars argue that “EU law conflicts with the international conventions 
and the exclusivity of their application”26. Their arguments are based on several 
observations. 
                                         
20 See: Air Baltic Corporation, supra note 5. 
21 International Air Transport Association, European Low Fares Airline Association, supra note 4, para 
45; Emeka Nelson, supra note 19, para 49. 
22 International Air Transport Association, European Low Fares Airline Association, supra note 4, para 47. 
23 See also: Paul Dempsey and Svante O. Johansson, “Montreal v. Brussels: The Conflict of Laws on the 
Issue of Delay in International Air Carriage,” Air and Space Law 35 (2010): 207. 
24 Paul Dempsey and Michael Milde, supra note 11, 177. 
25 See: Denise McDonagh v. Ryanair Ltd, (C-12/11) EU:C:2013:43 [2013], para 31. 
26 Paul Dempsey and Svante O. Johansson, supra note 23: 207. See also: Jorn J. Wegter, “The ECJ 
Decision of 10 January 2006 on the Validity of Regulation 261/2004: Ignoring the Exclusivity of the 
Montreal Convention,” Air and Space Law 31 2 (2006): 133. 
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First, some criticism relates to the exclusivity of the Montreal Convention. 
From the findings of the EUCJ case law the scholars conclude that compensations 
provided in Regulation No 261/2004 are supplementary to the damages recoverable 
by passengers under Article 19 of the Montreal Convention.27 In such case these 
compensations violate the requirement of Article 29 of Montreal Convention.28 J. J. 
Wegter states that “what the Regulation defines as ‘assistance’ and ‘care’ falls 
within the meaning of ‘damage’ as contained in Article 19 of the Montreal 
Convention” and thus Regulation No 261/2004 ignores the exclusivity of Montreal 
Convention.29 
Second, if these compensations under Regulation No 261/2004 are 
supplementary then passengers are able “to receive double recovery under both 
the EU rules and the Montreal Convention”30 and it “may well exceed the 4,150 
SDR ceiling provided in the Convention”31 . Other scholars point out that some 
passengers are able to receive double recovery while others may not be covered 
under the Regulation No 261/ 2004.32 
Third, there is no clear definition of “delay”. According to Anglo-American and 
Scandinavian law “delay” means not only late “fulfilment of the obligation but also 
non-performance altogether”; whereas in continental law the term “non-
performance" is not “included in the definition of delay”33. Thus, scholars offer to 
the EUCJ to maintain in its’ case-law “that the Flight Cancellation and Denied 
Boarding do not address ‘delay’ ”34. An example of such a proposal is Sturgeon v. 
Condor Flugdienst case where the EUCJ declared “that passengers whose flights are 
delayed may be treated, for the purposes of the application of the right to 
compensation, as passengers whose flights are cancelled <...> where they suffer, 
on account of a flight delay, a loss of time equal to or in excess of three hours 
<...>”35. 
Fourth, the EUCJ has repeatedly held that the air carrier paying damages has 
the right to seek compensation from any person, including third parties and that 
such compensation may reduce or remove the financial burden borne by the 
carriers in consequence of those obligations.36 Thus, scholars presume that “air 
                                         
27 Paul Dempsey and Svante O. Johansson, supra note 23: 220. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Jorn J. Wegter, supra note 26: 146-147. 
30 Paul Dempsey and Svante O. Johansson, supra note 23: 219. 
31 Ibid.: 220. 
32 Arnold Kinga, “Application of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 on Denied Boarding, Cancellation and Long 
Delay of Flights,” Air and Space Law 32 (2007): 94. 
33 33 Paul Dempsey and Svante O. Johansson, supra note 23: 210. 
34 Ibid.: 220. 
35 Christopher Sturgeon, Gabriel Sturgeon, Alana Sturgeon v. Condor Flugdienst GmbH, (C-402/07) 
EU:C:2009:716 [2009], para 69. 
36 International Air Transport Association, European Low Fares Airline Association, supra note 4, para 
90; Finnair Oyj v.Timy Lassooy, (C-22/11) EU:C:2012:604 [2012], para 39. 
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navigation service providers may find themselves potentially subject to liability for 
costs incurred by air carriers”37. 
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW OF THE EUCJ IN PROTECTION OF 
AIR PASSENGER RIGHTS 
In order to reveal the development of the EUCJ case law in protection of air 
passengers’ rights, it is appropriate to analyse different remedies from this 
perspective. 
2.1. THE CONCEPT OF FLIGHT, OPERATED FLIGHTS AND ITINERARY 
In the case of Emirates Airlines a dispute arose because an applicant booked a 
round trip from the EU MS to the third country and back.38 However, he returned 
back to the EU two days later because the return flight was cancelled. The air 
carrier was not a Community carrier. The applicant brought an action claiming 
compensation and relying on 5(1)(c) and 7(1)(c) of the Regulation. He argued the 
outward and return flights are both parts of one flight and since the flight started in 
a MS, the applicant falls within the scope of the Regulation as laid down in Article 
3(1). The air carrier argued the outward and return flights cannot be regarded as 
two separate flights and the air carrier, as a non-Community carrier, is not liable to 
pay compensation. 
The EUCJ defined the notion of a flight when a passenger flies from the EU MS 
to the third country and returns back. It found that the concept of a “flight” under 
the Regulation means an air transport operation, “a “unit” of such transport”, 
performed by an air carrier which fixes its itinerary”39. In the Sturgeon case the 
EUCJ specified that itinerary is an “essential element of the flight”40. Furthermore, 
in the Sousa Rodríguez case41 the EUCJ explained the meaning of the operated 
flight which focuses on itinerary as an essential element. It found that the concept 
of itinerary means the journey from the airport of departure to the airport of arrival 
by aeroplane according to a fixed schedule. Thus, the flight is operated when the 
aircraft reaches its destination according to the itinerary. 
The EUCJ in Emirates Airlines case stated that if a flight within the meaning of 
Article 3(1)(a) of the Regulation would be understood as an outward and return 
                                         
37 Paul Dempsey and Svante O. Johansson, supra note 23: 222. 
38 Emirates Airlines, supra note 4. 
39 Ibid., para 40.  
40 Christopher Sturgeon, supra note 35, para 30; Aurora Sousa Rodríguez, Yago López Sousa, Rodrigo 
Manuel Puga Lueiro Luis Ángel Rodríguez González, María del Mar Pato Barreiro, Manuel López Alonso, 
Yaiza Pato Rodríguez v. Air France SA, (C-83/10) EU:C:2011:652 [2011], para 26. 
41 Ibid. 
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journey, the final destination of journey would coincide with the first point of 
departure. In this case Article 3(1)(a) of the Regulation would be senseless. 42 
Besides, if a flight would mean an outward and return journey then it would worsen 
the high level of passenger’s protection since compensation could be requested only 
once.43 Moreover, it would further deprive air passenger rights in case of flight from 
the EU when the air carrier is a non-Community carrier.44 The EUCJ concluded that 
an outward and return journey cannot be regarded as a single flight. It follows that 
Article 3(1)(a) of the Regulation cannot be applied to a journey out and back, when 
passengers depart from an airport located in the EU MS travel back to that airport 
from an airport located in a third country.45 
The protection provided by the Regulation is not applied when a non-
Community carrier operates air services for a flight from the third country to the 
EU, even if it operates a flight from the EU to the non-member country and the 
passenger bought the round trip. Such interpretation confirms that the application 
of the Regulation is coupled with the type of air carrier. 
2.2. THE CONCEPT OF EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES 
An air carrier can be excluded from civil liability (Article 5(3) of the 
Regulation) if it proves that the flight is cancelled due to extraordinary 
circumstances. Often disputes arise about how the concept of “extraordinary 
circumstances” shall be applicable. 
Recital 14 in the preamble of the Regulation provides that extraordinary 
circumstances are those “which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable 
measures had been taken”. The list named in the recital (political instability, 
meteorological conditions incompatible with the operation of the flight concerned, 
security risks, unexpected flight safety shortcomings and strikes) was established 
as indicative because these events may result in the emergence of extraordinary 
circumstances.46 
The EUCJ 47  acknowledged that a collision between an aircraft and a bird 
“must be classified as “extraordinary circumstance” within the meaning of Article 
5(3) of the Regulation.48 However, in Article 5(3) of the Regulation besides the 
concept of “extraordinary circumstances” the concept of „all reasonable measures“ 
is used. It follows that it is not enough to establish “extraordinary circumstances” 
                                         
42 Emirates Airlines, supra note 4, para 34. 
43 Ibid., para 36. 
44 Ibid., para 37. 
45 Ibid., para 53. 
46 Friederike Wallentin-Hermann, supra note 4, para 22. 
47 Marcela Pešková, Jiří Peška v. Travel Service a.s., (C-315/15) EU:C:2017:342 [2017]. 
48 Ibid., para 24, 33.  
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because the air carrier still has to prove that extraordinary circumstances could not 
have been avoided even by taking all reasonable measures. Thus, the Court 
emphasized that there are technical devices by which anti-bird control can be 
executed and there is a big spectrum of transport operators who could be 
responsible for anti-bird control measures. 49  Also some technical devices are 
typically fitted on board of aircraft.50 Thus, a mere collision between aircraft and 
birds is not an issue that removes the air carrier’s liability per se. 
In that regard a two-step test for national courts in such cases was 
established. First, the court has to assess whether the air carrier was in a position 
to take directly or indirectly preventive measures to reduce possible collisions with 
birds. Second, to ensure that the measures did not require to make intolerable 
sacrifices in the light of the capacities of its undertaking.51 
In Wallentin-Hermann52, van der Lans53, Kramme v SAS Scandinavian54 cases 
the EUCJ pointed out that there could be various occasions that may result in the 
emergence of extraordinary circumstances, for instance, a hidden manufacturing 
defect made by aircraft manufacturer, acts of sabotage or terrorism.55 
In Wallentin-Hermann 56  the EUCJ established another two-step test. 
According to it, the national judicial institutions must check whether the technical 
problems derive from the events which are not typical “in the normal exercise of 
the activity of the air carrier concerned and were beyond its actual control”57. A 
technical problem, even if it causes a flight cancellation, does not fall into the scope 
of the concept of “extraordinary circumstances” within the meaning of Article 5(3) 
of the Regulation, unless this problem stemmed from events which are not typical 
to the normal exercise of the activity and are beyond the actual control.58 
This same rationale was repeated in the Sturgeon and Böck joined cases59, 
Sandy Siewert v Condor Flugdienst GmbH case60. In the latter case the flight delay 
occurred because an airport’s set of mobile boarding stairs had collided with the 
aircraft. The air carrier claimed that these are “extraordinary circumstances” within 
the meaning of Article5(3) of the Regulation and it is not obliged to pay 
compensation. The EUCJ found that the usage of an airport’s set of mobile boarding 
                                         
49 Ibid., para 40. 
50 Ibid., para 39; Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Delivered on 28 July 2016, para 32. 
51 Ibid., para 44, 46. 
52 Friederike Wallentin-Hermann, supra note 4, para 26. 
53 Corina van der Lans v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV, (C-257/14) EU:C:2015:618 [2015], 
para 38. 
54 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Delivered on 27 September, 2007. 
55 Friederike Wallentin-Hermann, supra note 4, para 26. 
56 Friederike Wallentin-Hermann, supra note 4.  
57 Ibid., para 27. 
58 Ibid., para 34. 
59 Christopher Sturgeon, supra note 35, para 72. 
60  Sandy Siewert, Emma Siewert, Nele Siewert v. Condor Flugdienst GmbH, (C-394/14) 
EU:C:2014:2377 [2014], para 18. 
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stairs is a typical everyday activity as it enables air passengers to enter or leave an 
aircraft and this activity is repeated many times a day. Accordingly, it cannot be 
covered by the concept of “extraordinary circumstances”61. A similar conclusion was 
reached by the EUCJ in the van der Lans case.62 
The development of the EUCJ case law reveals that, if the question arises 
whether certain technical problems fall or do not fall within the definition of 
“extraordinary circumstance” two aspects should be considered: first, whether 
these events are inherent in the normal exercise of an air carrier’s activity; second, 
whether these events are within the actual control of air carrier. Accordingly in the 
same way the questions should be answered when dealing with other 
circumstances. For example, in the Peškova case the EUCJ acknowledged that a 
collision between an air carrier and a bird should be considered as “extraordinary 
circumstances” under Article 5(3) of the Regulation because first, a collision 
between the air carrier and a bird is not inherent in the normal exercise of the 
activity of the air carrier and, second, are outside its actual control.63 
2.2.1. TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC VIABILITY IN LIGHT OF 
EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES 
In some cases the dilemma has arisen whether certain events fall within the 
definition of extraordinary circumstances, but not all of them lead to the exemption 
from obligations of air carriers. According to the case law of the EUCJ when the 
dispute concerns “extraordinary circumstances”, it is necessary to assess whether 
an air carrier technically and economically could avoid negative consequences at 
the time of extraordinary circumstances. 
In the Wallentin-Hermann case the EUCJ formulated technical and economic 
viability criterion of an air carrier to operate flights at the time of extraordinary 
circumstances. These criteria are as follows: first, an air carrier deploys all its 
resources in terms of staff, or equipment and the financial means at its disposal, 
second, air carrier does not make intolerable sacrifices. Accordingly, the EUCJ 
states that a national court in the circumstances of cancellation of the flight 
resulted from possible extraordinary circumstances should ascertain whether the air 
carrier took measures appropriate to the situation.64 
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The EUCJ has further developed the doctrine of technical and economic 
criteria in the Eglītis ir Ratnieks case.65 In this case the dispute arose because 
Swedish air space was closed due to failures in the power supply which led to a 
breakdown in radars and air navigation systems. However, the applicants claimed 
that the flight was cancelled because the working hours of the crew of that flight 
was expired.66 
The EUCJ relied on its above-mentioned preliminary ruling in the Wallentin-
Herman case. In the latter the Court emphasised that in order to prevent the 
cancellation of the flight resulted from the extraordinary circumstances an air 
carrier must prove that it deployed all its resources and did not make intolerable 
sacrifices.67 
The EUCJ in Eglītis ir Ratnieks found that in case of “extraordinary 
circumstances” an air carrier must take all reasonable steps to take care of air 
passengers “<…> the reasonable air carrier must organise its resources in good 
time to provide for some reserve time, so as to be able, if possible, to operate that 
flight once the extraordinary circumstances have come to an end. If <…> an air 
carrier does not, however, have any reserve time, it cannot be concluded that it has 
taken all reasonable measures as provided for in Article 5(3) of Regulation No 
261/2004”68. However, the EUCJ emphasised that the required reserve time should 
not lead an air carrier “to make intolerable sacrifices in the light of the capacities of 
its undertaking at the relevant time”69. 
The question of technical and economic criteria was also examined in the 
Peškova case, when it turned out that the owner of the aircraft after the collision 
between aircraft and bird asked for the second inspection of technician as it refused 
to authorise the first one.70 The EUCJ clarified that an air carrier in extraordinary 
circumstances should use all resources of staff or equipment and the financial 
means “in order to avoid, as far as possible, the cancellation or delay of its 
flights” 71 . However, the EUCJ highlighted that the second inspection is not an 
appropriate measure and does not meet technical and economic criteria formulated 
in the Eglītis ir Ratnieks preliminary ruling (Eglītis ir Ratnieks, para 25). 72 Thus, a 
flight cancellation and a long delay cannot be considered extraordinary 
circumstances. 
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2.2.2. DO EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES EXEMPT THE AIR 
CARRIER FROM THE DUTY TO PROVIDE CARE OF PASSENGERS? 
In the event of extraordinary circumstances resulting in a disruption in air 
travel the Regulation imposes an obligation on the air carrier with the goal to 
mitigate the negative impact of those circumstances on air passengers by providing 
care. 
In the McDonagh case the national court asked whether the closures of 
European airspace due to the eruption of the volcano which caused disruption to air 
travel, go beyond “extraordinary circumstances” within the meaning of the 
Regulation and if yes, whether these circumstances do not exempt an air carrier 
from the duty to provide care within the meaning of Article 5(1)(b) and Article 9.73 
The EUCJ pointed out that the air carrier should provide care in the case of 
flight cancellation whatever happened74 . Moreover, the duty to provide care to 
passengers under Article 5 and 9 of the Regulation should not “be subject to a 
temporal or monetary limitation” 75 . Otherwise it would deny the aims of the 
Regulation.76 
The EUCJ also concluded that if a passenger claims compensation, in a 
situation in which the air carrier did not provide care to him or her, the amount of 
compensation should be assessed by the national court.77 
Consequently, two aspects shall be highlighted. First, extraordinary 
circumstances do not exempt an air carrier from the duty to provide care of 
passengers within the provisions and goals of the Regulation. Second, even in the 
absence of extraordinary circumstances a carrier must always provide care to the 
passengers regardless the reasons of its failure to provide care to air passengers. 
2.3. FLIGHT DELAY OR CANCELLATION? 
Article 7 of the Regulation governs compensations in cases of denied boarding 
(Article 4(3)), cancellation of flights (Article 5(1)(c)). However, in practice disputes 
also arise because passengers claim compensation in the event of delay. 
Consequently, the EUCJ has repeatedly answered if a flight delay can be 
considered as flight cancellation and repeatedly interpreted distinctive features 
between flight delay and cancellation. 
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The EUCJ tried to separate the notions of ‘cancelled’ and ‘delayed’. According 
to the EUCJ, a flight is delayed when “it is operated in accordance with the original 
planning and its actual departure time is later than the scheduled departure 
time”78. Thus, the notion of ‘flight delay’ is associated with the scheduled departure 
time, but other elements, for example, such as itinerary, must remain unchanged.79 
Cancellation means non-operation of a flight which was previously planned. 
Thus, the EUCJ concluded that the flight which is delayed, even if the duration is 
long, cannot be regarded as cancelled.80 The EUCJ emphasised that a flight the 
departure time of which is later than the departure time scheduled in the timetable, 
can be considered as cancelled. However, it can be only if the air carrier arranges 
(for the passengers) another flight planning time of which is different from the 
previously planned flight.81 
The impression is that the notion of ‘flight delay’ is associated merely with the 
scheduled departure time. However, in the Folkerts case82 the EUCJ highlighted 
that in other contexts the Regulation governs another situation when the flight is 
delayed.83 This situation is determined not by the scheduled departure time, but by 
arrival to the final destination time (Article 5(c)(iii)). 84  It follows that legal 
consequences are related with the “reaching of final destination a certain amount of 
time after the cancelled flight’s scheduled time of arrival”85, because inconveniences 
resulted from the cancelled flights are experienced on arrival at the final 
destination. 86  EUCJ, explaining the second situation, relies on the Convention, 
which does not differ the notions ‘flight delay’ or ‘cancellation’. Therefore, the 
Convention does not specify “at which stage of such carriage the delay in question 
must occur”87. 
The EUCJ compared the situations of passengers when the flight is delayed 
and cancelled in both the Sturgeon and Nelson cases.88 The EUCJ acknowledged 
that passengers in both situations suffer similar damage because of a loss of time. 
Besides, under Article 5(1)(c) of the Regulation in the case of flight cancellation 
passengers have the right to compensation when they lose three hours or more. In 
contrast, passengers in the case of a flight delay do not have the same right. Thus, 
according to the EUCJ, passengers of a delayed flight “would be treated less 
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79 Ibid., para 31. 
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favourably” even if they suffer similar damage.89 Thus, the EUCJ concluded that 
passengers whose flights are delayed have right to compensation under Article 7 of 
the Regulation when they reach the final destination three hours or more after the 
arrival time originally scheduled.90 
Three-hour critics could not understand why three hours were chosen, not, for 
example, two or four hours. J. Malenovský reminds that “it is the legislator and not 
the Court who made the choice of three hours” 91 because the choice of three hours 
comes from Article 5 (1) (c) (iii) and not from Article 6 of the Regulation. 
2.4. ARTICLE 22 OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 12 OF THE 
REGULATION: MATERIAL AND NON-MATERIAL DAMAGE 
Rather often the disputes are related to the air carrier’s obligation to 
compensate material and non-material damage arising from breach of a contract of 
carriage by air. 
In the Alex Walz case the dispute arose because the applicant claimed 
damages for the value of the lost baggage and for non-material damage.92 The air 
carrier did not agree with the amount because it exceeded the limit for liability in 
relation to baggage. Consequently, the national court asked the EUCJ whether 
Article 22(2) of the Convention include both types of damage – non-material and 
material damage. 
Since the Convention is an international treaty, the EUCJ relied on Article 
31(2) of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
and explained that the injury includes material or moral damage within the 
meaning of Chapter III of the Convention.93 
In the Sousa Rodríguez case94 the EUCJ clarified whether the national court 
on the basis of national legal order may oblige the air carrier to pay for damage, 
including non-material, because of the breach of a contract of carriage by air.95 The 
EUCJ relying on Article 12 of the Regulation found that a national court may oblige 
the air carrier to compensate damage for passengers because of the breach of the 
contract of carriage by air on other legal basis than the Regulation, i.e. the 
Convention and national law.96 
                                         
89 Ibid., para 58. 
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Moreover, the EUCJ relied on the Alex Walz case97 findings that the term 
“damage” must include material and non-material damage. In light of the foregoing 
the EUCJ decided that under Article 12 of the Regulation damage for which 
compensation is payable may be material or non-material.98 
Thus, a passenger may claim for material and non-material damage under 
both the Convention and the Regulation. The difference between these acts is that 
under the Convention the maximum amount of the claimed damage is established 
in the Convention and it cannot be exceed (included both types of damage). In 
contrast, the Regulation established a minimum amount of compensation for 
material and non-material damage. However, it does not deprive a passenger 
relying on the Convention or national law to claim for additional compensation. 
2.5. DENIED BOARDING 
The term ‘denied boarding’ is given in Article 2(j) and Article 4 of the 
Regulation. Article 2(j) gives a list of the situations (reasons of health, safety or 
security, or inadequate travel documentation) as reasonable grounds to deny 
boarding. In the Finnair case the EUCJ noted that this list is non-exhaustive.99 
The EUCJ relying on recitals 3, 4, 9, 10 of the Preamble of the Regulation and 
travaux préparatoires for this regulation found that “the EU legislator expanded the 
scope of the definition of ‘denied boarding’ beyond merely situations where 
boarding is denied on account of overbooking <…> and construed ‘denied boarding’ 
broadly as covering all circumstances in which an air carrier might refuse to carry a 
passenger”100. Otherwise, it would limit protection of air passenger’s rights and 
would be contrary to the aim of the Regulation.101 According to the EUCJ, this is the 
reason for a broad interpretation of the rights granted to passengers. 
Accordingly, the notion of ‘denied boarding’ within the meaning of Articles 2(j) 
and 4 of the Regulation relates not only to the case when boarding is denied due to 
overbooking but also when boarding is denied due to other grounds (for instance, 
operational reasons).102 
The EUCJ in the Rodríguez Cachafeiro and Martínez-Reboredo Varela-Villamor 
case came to a similar conclusion.103 
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In sum, the concept of ‘denied boarding’ is not fully disclosed in the 
Regulation and it may include other situations where boarding is denied in order to 
maintain the aim of the Regulation. 
2.6. ARRIVAL TIME 
Articles 2, 5, 7 of the Regulation establish the term ‘arrival time’, which is not 
defined. Thus, the EUCJ in the Germanwings case establishes the actual arrival time 
of aircraft.104 
In this case the dispute arose because the applicant reached his final 
destination more than three hours after the scheduled arrival time. The applicant 
required compensation on the basis of Articles 5 to 7 of the Regulation.  However, 
the air carrier claimed that the actual arrival time means the moment when the 
plane touches down on the tarmac at an airport, consequently, the delay was two 
hours and 58 minutes. Thus, according to air carrier, compensation should not be 
paid.105 
The EUCJ examined what moment should be considered as the time of arrival. 
It analysed situation of air passengers and concluded that passengers may continue 
their ordinary activities when they are permitted to leave the aircraft and the order 
to open the doors of aircraft is given. Before this moment air passengers are in the 
enclosed space of aircraft and they are limited to resume their normal activities.106 
2.7. THE EMPLOYER’S RIGHT TO CLAIM DAMAGES UNDER THE 
CONVENTION 
As we have mentioned in first part of this research, in contrast to the 
Regulation under the Convention an employer has the right to claim damages. 
In one of the cases the EUCJ had to define the concept of passenger. In the 
STT case a dispute arose because two employees of certain agency, which 
purchased flight tickets from EU MS to third country, reached the final destination 
of their business travel one day after the scheduled arrival time.107 The agency 
required to be compensated by the air carrier. The latter stated that an employer 
does not have the right to be compensated because under Article 19 of the 
Convention this right belongs to passengers but not to legal person. 
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The EUCJ explained that Article 19 of the Convention “does not specify in any 
manner whatsoever who may have suffered that damage”108. Moreover, in the third 
recital in the preamble to the Convention the term ‘consumer’ is used. According to 
the EUCJ this may include not only passengers. 109  Thus, Article 19 of the 
Convention may be applied not “only to damage caused to passengers themselves 
but also to damage suffered by an employer” 110 . Besides, Article 1(1) of the 
Convention uses the term “person”, but not “passenger”. 
3. PROTECTION OF AIR PASSENGER RIGHTS IN THE CASE LAW OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA (hereinafter – SCRL) 
Over the last ten years Lithuanian case-law has been enriched by the cases in 
the air passenger’s rights. 
3.1. DOMESTIC LEGAL REGULATION AND NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 
BODY 
The main national acts which govern air passenger rights are the Civil Code, 
the Aviation Law, the Law on Tourism, other codes of separate transport branches, 
and statutes. 
Claims related to air passenger rights are brought before the civil courts 
under the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the national regulation establishes not 
mandatory pre-trial settlement procedure: a passenger’s complaint shall be first 
filed with the air carrier. If an unsatisfactory response is given a passenger may file 
the claim to the court. Also the passenger can turn to the national enforcement 
body – Civil Aviation Administration. But the decision of national enforcement body 
is not binding. 
3.2. CONCERNING THE CONVENTION COMPATIBILITY WITH THE 
REGUALTION 
The SCRL analysed the relationship between the Convention and the 
Regulation only in one case. 111  It was necessary because a respondent in his 
response to the complaint relied on the Article 33 of the Convention in order to 
define which national court (Lithuanian or Latvian) has jurisdiction to settle the 
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dispute. The court basically followed the EUCJ findings in the IATA ir ELFAA case112, 
and the Rehder case113. 
3.3. WHO BEARS LIABILITY WHEN THE AIR CARRIER AND THE FLIGHT 
TICKET VENDOR ARE DIFFERENT? 
National courts had the opportunity to draw a line between the liability of an 
air carrier and a flight ticket vendor. 
In the civil case two defendants were identified - one bought two tickets for 
the applicants and had to arrange and pay a fixed price for the services provided to 
the air carrier in the manner prescribed by the agreement, the other one had to 
provide a technically sound aircraft with a qualified crew for passengers, luggage 
and cargo.114 
The SCRL noted that the obligations imposed by the Regulation are on the air 
carrier operating or intending to operate. Thus, it had to determine which entity 
operated as the air carrier in the case. It concluded that under the Regulation, the 
operating air carrier must respond to the passengers under the conditions set out in 
the Regulation when the flight is cancelled and that the Regulation does not provide 
for the fulfilment of the obligations imposed on it by the person who sold flight 
tickets, unless the air carrier itself carries out the sale of tickets. 
An interesting fact is that the flight ticket seller and the air carrier concluded 
the air carriage contract, under which the ticker seller was liable if scheduled flights 
were unpaid and therefore cancelled. 
The SCRL decided that this condition is incompatible with Article 15 of the 
Regulation and provisions of Civil Code. According to the national law conditions of 
carriage contract abolishing or restraining the carrier‘s civil liability shall not be 
valid with the exceptions provided by law. The court also found that parties of the 
agreement cannot alter, limit, abolish the validity and application of mandatory 
rules, no matter whether national or international law sets these standards. 
3.4. THE OBLIGATION OF THE TOUR OPERATOR TO COMPENSATE FOR 
THE DELAYED FLIGHT 
Lithuanian courts have dealt with the disputes related to the liability of the 
tour operator for the damage caused to air passengers due to the delay of flights. 
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114 R. G., A. G., A. J., v. “Palangos Avia”, “Aurela”, Supreme Court of the Republic of Lithuania (2008, No 
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The SCRL concluded that air passengers could seek compensation not from the 
operating air carrier but from the tour operator. 
In one case a question of legal interpretation was raised, whether a tourist 
can claim for damages caused by the delayed flight directly from the tour operator 
within the meaning of Article 7 of the Regulation.115 
The court of appeal stated that the services of carriage was provided by the 
third person. It follows that the compensation should be provided not by the air 
carrier but by the tour operator. The SCRL disagreed with the findings of the court 
of appeal.  It relied on the provisions of the Law on Tourism and the case law. 
According to the latter, a tour operator as the business entity must ensure the 
quality of the services provided and the correctness of their information, assume 
the risk of the negative consequences of its activity, also carefully choose third 
parties in order to fulfil its obligations and enjoy the possibility to control activity of 
the third parties. Thus, the SCRL concluded that civil liability for the improper tour 
services, although certain part of the services was provided by the third person 
chosen by the tour operator, is applicable to the tour operator. 
Also the SCRL relied on the provisions of the Regulation. The Court found that 
the Regulation imposes obligations on the air carrier. The Regulation does not 
directly govern obligations on the tour operator. However, it does not forbid it. The 
Court relied on 5 recital in the preamble of the Regulation, governing that 
“protection should apply to passengers not only on scheduled but also on non-
scheduled flights, including those forming part of package tours”. The right to 
compensation laid down in Article 7 of the Regulation also is applicable to the air 
passenger whose flight forms a part of package tour. Consequently, the Court 
concluded that the interpretation of the provisions of the Regulation confirms that it 
does not prevent a passenger from claiming compensation from the tour operator. 
It also emphasized that having provided a compensation equal to the amount 
specified in the Regulation to the air passenger, the tour operator is entitled to 
request repayment from the operating air carrier. 
3.5. DUE TO EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTACNES 
Lithuanian courts have already dealt with issues related to flight cancellation 
or delay of flights resulting from extraordinary circumstances. However, several 
such cases were resolved and it should be confirmed that Lithuanian courts follow 
the EUCJ case law. 
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In one case it was estimated that a technical problem was detected before the 
flight.116 The problem was fixed and the flight was carried out. The defendant in the 
main proceedings had not provided evidence that this malfunction was due to the 
events which are not inherent in the normal exercise of an air carrier’s activity and 
are not within the actual control of air carrier. Thus, national courts, following the 
case law of the EUCJ, decided that there is no reason to assert that the technical 
problem of an aircraft dresulted from the events which by their nature or cause of 
their occurrence are not inherent in the normal exercise of an air carrier’s activity 
and are not within the actual control of air carrier. Therefore, according to the 
SCRL, there is no reason for the defendant to be exempted from the obligation to 
pay compensation under Article 7 of the Regulation. 
In another case the delay of the flight was an hour and twenty minutes. It 
happened after a Eurocontrol order was released to delay the flight due to German 
airspace restrictions.117 Following the operation of the flight to Brussels-Riga the 
aircraft flying from Riga to Vilnius did not wait for the passengers coming from 
Brussels. Thus, the applicant went from Riga to Vilnius via bus and reached her 
final destination four hours after the arrival time originally scheduled. The 
defendant claimed that the flight from Brussels to Riga was delayed due to the 
extraordinary circumstances as the Eurocontrol order is not inherent in the normal 
exercise of an air carrier’s activity. Consequently, according to the defendant, 
compensation within the meaning of the Article 5(1)(c) of the Regulation should not 
be provided to the applicant. In this case the national court relied on the findings of 
the EUCJ in the Eglītis and Ratnieks case that air carrier while planning its flight 
must organise its resources appropriately taking into account the risks associated 
with the occurrence of extraordinary circumstances. 118  The SCRL noted that 
Eurocontrol orders are binding. However, such order which resulted the delay of 
flight could be identified as an extraordinary circumstance only if that delay was 
long and an air carrier would have demonstrated that during the planning of the 
flight Brussels-Riga the risk of such a delay was assessed and all reasonable 
measures were taken in order to avoid delays or cancellations, for example, 
sufficient time between the flights. Finally, according to the Court, the delayed 
arrival to the final destination was also determined by the fact that the aircraft from 
Riga to Vilnius did not wait for the passengers from the flight Brussels-Riga. Thus, 
the Court concluded that in this case Article 5(3) of the Regulation is not applicable. 
Moreover, a national court also relied on 15 recital in the preamble of the 
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Regulation which defines several conditions when air traffic management decision 
should be deemed as extraordinary circumstances: long delay, overnight delay, 
cancellation of one or more flights. It means that in this case the air carrier must 
pay compensation. It also means that in some situations Eurocontrol orders should 
be considered extraordinary circumstances.  
3.6. NON-MATERIAL DAMAGE UNDER ARTICLE 12 OF THE 
REGULATION AND ARTICLE 22 OF THE CONVENTION 
The applicant sought compensation under Article 7 of the Regulation. She 
claimed damages, because the flight was delayed for one hour and twenty minutes. 
This was the reason why she went by bus (about 300 km) and reached the final 
destination four hours later than planned. 119  The applicant had to go to her 
workplace without taking a rest. A national court relied on the Sousa Rodríguez 
case and provisions of the Civil Code (namely Article 6.250) which establishes the 
notion of non-material damage.120 
According to Article 25 of the Civil Code, damage caused by the violation of 
non-material assets, as well as in the case of material damages, requires all 
conditions of civil liability (unlawful acts, causation, guilt and injury). The applicant 
should prove the occurrence of non-material damage and provide appropriate 
arguments and evidence. According to the applicant, the damage resulted 
inconveniences caused by the delay of flight. The Court pointed out that the 
applicant should state the reasons that compensation within the meaning of the 
Regulation does not cover all non-material damage resulted from a delay of flight. 
According to the SCRL, the fact that the applicant reached the final destination by 
bus and not by plane is irrelevant for the determination of non-material damage 
within the meaning of Article 6.250 of Civil Code. Besides, the Regulation does not 
govern that the passengers of cancelled or delayed flights should reach the final 
destination by air transport. Moreover, the SCRL emphasised the short distance of 
traveling by bus. Thus, the inconveniences lasted for a short time and the applicant 
did not mention other arguments, besides the fact that she had to go to workplace 
without taking a rest. As a consequence, the SCRL concluded that the whole set of 
circumstances and criteria did not constitute sufficient grounds for admitting that 
the applicant had suffered greater moral damage than the compensation under the 
Regulation could provide. 
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Thus, in this case the SCRL decided on the conditions under which the air 
passenger may claim compensation for the damage higher than it is governed by 
the Regulation. 
There are also cases related to moral compensation under the Convention. 
Applicants claimed non-material damage from the tour operator because of the loss 
of baggage.121 In the baggage they had medications and other items necessary for 
traveling. The SCRL indicated that Article 22(2) of the Convention sets out limits of 
liability but it cannot be perceived as completely restricting the liability of tour 
operator. The Court, relying on the EUCJ ruling in the Axel Walz case and provisions 
of Civil Code, found that if the latter improperly performs other obligations arising 
from contract for tourism services which can be reasonably expected by the 
passenger limits set out in Article 22(2) of the Convention are not applicable. 
Consequently, in such cases the lower courts should assess whether the tour 
operator has to pay non-material damage (which was resulted by improper 
execution of contract for tourism services) under Article 6.754(5) of the Civil Code 
even if it exceeds the limits laid down in Article 22(2) of the Convention. The SCRL 
emphasised that the amount of non-material damage is determined by assessing 
specific personal inconveniences, other violations of non-material values. 
Consequently, the SCRL found that it is possible to claim more non-material 
damage than it is provided in the Convention. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
1. The ratione materia of the Regulation and the Convention differs. The 
application of the Regulation depends on the territory of departure and 
landing of the aircraft and the type of the carrier whereas the application of 
the Convention depends only on the territory of the State Parties. Moreover, 
the application of both acts differs since they protect different air passenger 
rights and provide different remedies.  
2. The EUCJ in its case law developed the protection of air passenger rights: 
2.1. If the question arises whether certain technical problems fall within the 
definition of “extraordinary circumstances” two aspects should be considered 
whether the events are normal in practice and the air carrier could have 
controlled them.  
2.2. Also the EUCJ formulated technical and economic viability criterion of an air 
carrier to operate flights at the time of extraordinary circumstances. First, an 
air carrier deploys all its resources in terms of staff, or equipment and the 
                                         
121 D. S., V. S. v. Tez Tour, Supreme Court of the Republic of Lithuania (2013, No 3K-3-454). 
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financial means at its disposal. Second, an air carrier does not make 
intolerable sacrifices. 
2.3. In relation with the compensations when the flight is delayed, the EUCJ 
concluded that passengers whose flights are delayed have the right to 
compensation under Article 7 of the Regulation when they reach the final 
destination three hours or more after the arrival time originally scheduled. 
However, if an air carrier proves that delay occurred due to extraordinary 
circumstances passengers are not entitled to compensation. 
2.4. Passengers may claim for material and non-material damage under both the 
Convention and the Regulation. The difference is that under the Convention 
the maximum amount of the claimed damage is established in the Convention 
and it cannot be exceed (included both types of damage). In contrast, the 
Regulation establishes a minimum amount of compensation for material and 
non-material damage. However, it does not deprive a passenger to claim for 
additional compensation relying of the Convention or/and national laws. 
2.5. Under the Convention an employer has the right to claim damages when the 
employees are the passengers on a business trip. Whereas, the Regulation 
does not provide such a possibility and only passengers can claim for 
damages. 
3. The Supreme Court of the Republic of Lithuania only in one case has 
considered the compatibility of the Regulation and the Convention. The court 
basically follows the EUCJ findings and rely on them in cases related to the 
concept of extraordinary circumstances. However, the national courts of 
Lithuania in the air passenger rights protection area separated the liability of 
an air carrier and a flight ticket vendor, as well as an air carrier and a tour 
operator. 
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